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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W E S T G A L L E R Y CORPOR-
A T I O N , a Utah corporation, dba 
G A L L E R Y I T H E A T E R , D O N 
W A L L S and L I N D A T O L L I V E R , 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y BOARD O F 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13963 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
Appellant appeals from an order of the court be-
low granting respondents' motion to enjoin appellant 
from having a hearing without following its own ord-
inances and until the related criminal case had been 
resolved. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
Resposlents sought injunctive relief against ap-
pellant and obtained an order enjoining the hearing 
appellant sought. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seeks the dismissal of the instant ap-
peal or, in the alternative, the affirmance of the court's 
order. 
S T A T E M E N T S O F F A C T S 
On November 19, 1974, appellant caused to be 
served a notice of violation against respondents for 
showing an allegedly obscene movie, to wit: "Marriage 
and Other Four Letter Words". (R.19) An Order to 
Show Cause was issued by appellant on November 20, 
1974, (R.18) requiring respondents to appear and show 
cause why their business revenue and regulatory licenses 
should not be revoked. Thereafter, on November 22, 
1974, respondents sought and obtained a Temporary 
Restraining Order restraining the hearing by appellant. 
(R. 21, 31) On that date an Order to Show Cause was 
set for December 2, 1974, requiring appellant to show 
cause why it should not be enjoined from holding a 
hearing. On December 2, 1974, respondents Motion 
for a Preliminary Injunction pendente lite was granted. 
(R. 34). That is reflected in the lower court's order 
of December 17, 1974, (R. 35) from which this appeal 
is sought. 
2 
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The Record on Appeal contains the Salt Lake 
City Ordinance allegedly violated and the procedures 
set up to revoke a license for violating an Ordinance. 
(R. 5-17) The procedures set up by appellant for re-
voking a license are set forth in Section 20-20-18 et. seq. 
(R. 12-17) Basically, an advisory council was set up 
and that council was empowered to hold hearings and 
make findings as to whether or not a violation of the 
Ordinance had been committed. Those findings were 
to be forwarded to appellant Commissioners who then 
determined if a license should be revokel. (R. 13-15) 
In this case the record reveals those procedures 
were not followed. In fact, on January 14, 1975, those 
procedures were repealed. (R. 39) 
After the Order of December 17, 1974, (R. 35) 
which, when carefully read, simply says that appellant 
had to follow its ows ordinances in trying to revoke a 
license, respondents stood trial in Salt Lake City Court 
on a charge of violating a City Ordinance by showing 
an allegedly obscene movie, "Marriage and Other Four 
Letter Words''. The criminal charge was filed before 
appellant's order to show cause. This is the same al-
leged conduct that resulted in appellant's original Order 
to Show Cause. (R. 18-19) That trial resulted in a 
verdict of not guilty as to respondent Walls and a dis-
missal of the case as to respondent Tolliver. (Exhibit 
"B" , Affidavit) Therefore, the Salt Lake City Court 
case referred to in the Order appealed from (R. 35, 36) 
has been concluded, favorably to respondents. 
3 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E I N S T A N T A P P E A L S H O U L D B E 
D I S M I S S E D B E C A U S E T H E R E A R E NO 
I S S U E S I N T H I S CASE A N D T H E A P P E A L 
I S MOOT. 
I t is beyond dispute that this court will not decide 
abstract or moot questions to esablish a precedent or to 
guide future litigation. See e.g., Mikkelsen v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 22 Utah 2d 438, 455 P.2d 27 
(1969). 
In this case any issue raised by the Order appealed 
from (R. 35-36) is now moot because the Salt Lake 
City Court criminal litigation has now terminated. The 
Order itself refers in Paragraphs 2 and 3 to the crim-
inal proceedings and simply says that no action can be 
taken by appellant while the criminal case is pending. 
I t is not now pending, and the Order of the court be-
low has expired, and so this court has no issue facing it. 
The issues in the Order do not now rest upon exist-
ing facts, and an event has occurred (conclusion of 
the criminal case) which changes the Order in essence 
and Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Order do not have any 
effect. 
I t is true that the injunction still needs toTbe dis-
solved but the dispute that brought the case here (can 
appellant hold a hearing to see if respondents violated 
4 
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an Ordinance when the same question is pending in a 
criminal case involving the same alleged perpetrators) 
has ceased to exist. How could there be a question as 
to that if there is now no criminal case? What decision 
could this court render that would do more than guide 
future litigation. If this court reversed the lower court 
that would have no effect because appellant could not 
now have a hearing while the other case is pending be-
cause it is not pending. To affirm the lower court would 
also be an empty gesture because it would be to say the 
appellant could not in the past have held a hearing 
while a criminal case was pending. That would be a 
guide to future litigation, but this court has often held 
it does not hear and decide cases for that reason. 
Further, the court's Order in Paragraph 1 said 
that appellant must follow its own procedures, which 
have since been repealed. (R. 39) This clearly makes 
the issues of Paragraph 1 moot. See, e.g., Mikkelsen, 
supra, for a case becoming moot "by reason of new 
legislation, or by reason of the expiration or the super-
ceding of existing litigation". 22 Utah 2d at 27. 
Thus, as this court's decision would be no more 
than an advisory opinion on moot issues, respondents 
pray that the appeal be dismissed. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E COURT B E L O W D I D NOT ACT 
P R E M A T U R E L Y OR A B U S E I T S D I S C R E -
5 
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T I O N I N O R D E R I N G A P P E L L A N T TO 
A B I D E B Y I T S OWN O R D I N A N C E S A N D 
E N J O I N I N G A H E A R I N G TO D E T E R M I N E 
T H E A L L E G E D O B S C E N I T Y O F A F I L M 
W H E N T H A T I D E N T I C A L I S S U E W A S 
P E N D I N G I N A C R I M I N A L CASE. 
Appellant's brief seems to be couched in terms of 
asking this court to overturn action of a lower court 
which engaged in a raw abuse of power and interfered 
with a municipal governing body's license revocation 
powers totally without cause and in a setting of a 
normal Kcense revocation hearing. This simply is not 
such a case. The events of this case are completely 
unique and must be examined in detail to see what 
the court below actually ruled. 
Salt Lake City enacted ordinances (R. 12-17) 
which set forth in detail the procedures appellant Board 
of Commissioners was to follow to determine whether 
or not a license should be revoked or suspended because 
of a violation of Section 20-20-18.1 of the ordinances. 
(R. 12) In this case those procedures were not followed 
by appellant but instead appellant chose to have a hear-
ing on its own initative to determine if a violation existed 
and hence a license should be revoked. The court below 
simply ruled appellant could not proceed in such a man-
ner. The court below did not "interfere" with appellant 
in its everyday practice of holding some sort of hearing. 
The court below "interfered" with appellant by ruling 
that it must follow the very procedures it enacted. 
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Respondents contend that this factual background 
entirely negates appellant's argument in Points I and 
I I of its brief. The cases cited by appellant for the 
proposition that the court abused its discretion are 
simply not in point nor persuasive. For example, in 
Aircraft and D. Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 
752 (1947), which appellant cites for the proposition 
that a court cannot take jurisdiction before a final 
administrative act, the Supreme Cour was dealing with 
a case where Congress had set up administrative pro-
cedures for the correction of abuses and so the court 
could not hear the matter until those procedures had 
been complied with. In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp., 503 U.S. 41, cited by appellant, the Supreme 
Court actually held as it did because the order of the 
N.L.R.B. was unenforceable until said order had been 
affirmed by the Circuit Court of appeals, and so an 
action to enjoin the N.L.R.B. in federal district court 
would not lie. 
Appellant also cites an opinion of this court, Shel-
ton v. Lees, 8 Utah 2d 88, 326 P.2d 386 (1958). That 
case is not in point in the slightest. Shelton dealt only 
with the statute, Utah Code Annotated, 58-22-19 
(1953), which set forth what is to be reviewed and pro-
vided that the Department of Registration was to be 
either affirmed or reversed on review by the district 
court but a trial de novo was not to be held by the dis-
trict court. Such a ruling by the court does not sup-
port appellant's position in this case. 
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The lower court's ruling was based on the rationale 
that appellant had to follow its own ordinances. The 
ruling went on, however, to say that even if appellant 
could deviate from its own orlinances it could not hold 
a hearing during the pendency of a criminal case in-
volving the same issue (obscenity or non-obscenity of a 
movie entitled "Marriage and Other Four Letter 
Words") and basically the same parties. (Salt Lake 
City, a Municipal corporation, v. Don Walls, James 
Piepenberg, and Linda Tolliver). The court's ruling 
on this issue is correct because the issues involve First 
Amendment claims. 
Appellant cites cases dealing with liquor licenses, 
child care homes, tax matters, food purveyors licenses, 
anl so on. None of the cases deal with the issues of free 
speech as does this case. That distinction is critical. The 
United States Supreme Court has often dealt with pro-
celures used by various governmental bodies in attempt-
ing to deal with allegedly pornographic materials and 
their operation on protected free speech. 
The starting point is Freedman v. Maryland, 380 
U.S. 51 (1965). In that case Maryland had a rather 
elaborate system dealing with the submission of movies 
to a Board of Censors before a movie could be shown. 
The film exhibitor did not submit the movie in question 
and challenged the statutory scheme's constitutionality 
on its face. The Maryland scheme fell short in several 
areas. The exhibitor had the burden of instituting jud-
8 
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icial proceedings persuading the court that material was 
protected by the First Amendment. The second 
infirmity was that the exhibition was barred until jud-
icial review was completed. Thirdly, the scheme was 
held to be invalid because it provided no assurance of 
prompt judicial determination. 
More recently and in light of Freedom the United 
States Supreme Court struck down Chicago's censor-
ship ordinance. In Tietel Film Corp v. Cusach, 360 
U.S. 139 (1968), Chicago had an administrative pro-
cedure which, by its terms, could take from 50 to 57 
days to complete before judicial proceedings could be 
instituted. That was one reason for the invalidity of the 
scheme under the dictates of Freedman. The court also 
held the Chicago ordinances violative of the constitution 
because there were no provisions for a prompt judicial 
decision. 
The above cases represent a much more specific 
attempt at proper regulation than does the one in this 
case. Here, there are absolutely no provisions existing 
that appellant was to follow. At least in Cusack there 
were some guidelines, even though invalid. Here, ap-
pellant on its own, not even following its own ordin-
ances, just seemingly devised a system whereby it 
ordered an order to show cause for responlents to 
come in and show cause why their licenses should not 
be revoked. 
9 
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Such a "scheme" magnifies each and every one of 
the three evils that the Court struck down in Freedrnan. 
First, the Court made it clear that the burden must rest 
on the censor to prove the material is not protected, i.e., 
the censor must show the material obscene. In this 
case while there is no censor's board, the effect is the 
same in that if the license was revoked that would 
amount to a final restraint. 
Secondly, if the license were revoked clearly no 
showing of the material could exist while judicial re-
view was sought. That exact feature was declared in-
valid in Freedrnan but at least there the ordinances 
specified the exhibitor could seek judicial review. As 
mentioned here, there is nothing setting forth any pro-
cedures to secure review and seemingly the exhibitor 
is left to his own imagination as to how to secure jud-
icial review. 
The third failure of the ordinances Freedrnan and 
Cusach decried was that there was no assurance of 
prompt judicial review. In Cusack times were specified 
but they were too lengthy. This requirement exists so 
that the decision of some board will not amount, in 
practical effect, to a final restraint without a judicial 
proceeding. Again, here there is no such procedure set 
up. Seemingly, if the license was revoked, respondents 
would somehow have to find their way through the local 
courts in a time consuming procedure to see if a court 
agreed with appellant's decision that the material was 
not protected. 
10 
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Those evils are precisely what the Court in Freed-
man and Cusack held may not exist. Only after an 
adversary judicial proceeding can a valid final restraint 
exist. This "scheme" or impromptu procedure attempt-
ed by appellants illustrates the dangers the court ten 
years ago sought to eliminate. 
Appellant has suggested that respondents could 
not get a court to interfere because maybe they would 
have nothing to complain about because appellant may 
not have revoked their license. Aside from real life 
practicalities in this case that argument totally fails in 
light of Freedman. There too, the exhibitor did not 
know if his movie could have "passed" the censor's 
board or not as he did not even submit it. The exhibitor 
there went to court before the censor acted and got a 
court to say, by declaratory judgment, the scheme was 
invalid. Here respondents sought the same thing in 
effect though via an injunction rather than declaratory 
judgment. Therefore, the argument that respondent 
was "premature" in going to court is totally rejected 
in Freedman. 
For these reasons respondents submit that the court 
below was correct and that its judgment should be 
affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, that the appeal is 
moot, respondents respectfully submit that the appeal 
should be dismissed. In the alternative, for the reasons 
above stated, the judgment and order of the court 
below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B R U C E C| L U B E C K 
Attorney for Respondents 
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